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Abstract: In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate con­
cepts. Several scholars take Kant’s statement at face value. They claim that Kant 
did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts and 
that Kant’s views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz’s. This 
paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the origin of 
intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Given two widespread 
notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and the input/output notion, 
intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz.
1 Introduction
In his essay against Eberhard, Kant emphatically denies that there are innate con­
cepts:
The Critique admits absolutely no implanted or innate representations. One and all, whether 
they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, it considers them as acquired.1
In particular, “universal transcendental concepts of the understanding”, i.  e. the 
categories, are “acquired and not innate” (Entd., 8:223, see 249). Several scholars 
take these statements at face value. They hold that Kant did not endorse concept 
innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts2, and that Kant’s views on 
innateness are significantly different from Leibniz’s.3
1 Entd., 8:221; see e.  g. Br, 11:82; ML2, 28:542; MMrongovius, 29:763; MK3, 29:949, 951  f. Transla­
tions of Kant’s writings, where available, are from Kant 1992–. I use small capitals to indicate 
concepts.
2 De Pierris 1987; Oberhausen 1997; Buroker 2006, 132–134.
3 Zöller 1989; Quarfood 2004, 86–89; Hanna 2014, §1.1.
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This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the 
origin of intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Moreover, given 
two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and the input/
output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz.4
When I use the expression “intellectual concepts” with regard to Leibniz, I 
refer to those that the New Essays call intellectual ideas or ideas of reflection (e.  g. 
NE, I.i.11, I.i.23). They are the ideas that, according to Leibniz, we should regard 
as innate even if we accepted people’s “common framework” and we held that 
some mental content derives from causal interactions with material bodies (NE, 
I.i.1, IV.iv.5). They include unity, substance, cause, possibility, action and 
virtue.5
Given Kant’s views, all concepts can be said to be intellectual, because the 
faculty that generates concepts is the intellect (KU, 5:406; LPölitz, 24:568). The 
intellect does this by conferring conceptual form to nonconceptual representa­
tions. However, when I use the expression “intellectual concepts” with regard to 
Kant, I refer to the concepts that he classes as being “given a priori”6 – concepts 
like unity, substance, cause, possibility, action and virtue.7 Given Kant’s 
views, these concepts are intellectual par excellence because the intellect pro­
vides not only their form, but also their content. This derives from the reflection 
that the intellect carries out on the acts that it performs in the course of experi­
ence.
The second section of this paper explains how this process takes place by 
focusing on the origin of the categories. They are Kant’s paradigmatic example of 
concepts given a priori and the only ones whose origin is discussed in several pas­
sages from the 1770s to the 1790s. The third section compares Kant’s and Leibniz’s 
views on the origin of intellectual concepts. It highlights the substantial agree­
ment between Kant’s and Leibniz’s views. It also argues that, given the dispos­
itional notion and the input/output notion of innateness, intellectual concepts 
are innate on Kant’s view no less than on Leibniz’s. The fourth section examines 
the objection that Kant cannot be a concept innatist because his texts contain 
three arguments against concept innatism. I argue that the three arguments are 
compatible with Kant’s innatism. They are best seen as attacking a different 
4 The texts cited in Section 2 show that Kant’s views on the origin of intellectual concepts 
remain substantially unaltered from the 1770s to the 1790s. I do not discuss Kant’s stance toward 
innatism in the 1750s and 1760s, on which see Oberhausen 1997, 72–75.
5 NE, Preface, 51; I.iii.3, I.iii.16, I.iii.18, II.i.2, IV.iv.5.
6 On the meaning of this expression, see p 21. below.
7 The first four are categories (A80/B106). Action is a predicable (A82/B108). On their non­em­
pirical origin, see A112. On virtue, see Religion, 6:183.
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kind of innatism, Christian Adolf Crusius’ preformationism. I conclude with an 
explanation of why Kant denied that he was a concept innatist, even though he 
ascribed concept innatism to Leibniz. (In what follows, the expressions ‘innatism’ 
and ‘innatist’ are used to refer specifically to concept innatism, as distinct from 
innatism regarding beliefs, biological traits, faculties or knowledge.)
2 Kant on the Origin of the Categories
Kant states that the categories, like all representations, “are acquired” (Entd., 
8:223). They are formed “on the occasion of experience; for on the occasion of 
experience and the senses the understanding forms concepts which are not from 
the senses […] We practice this action […] as soon as we have impressions of the 
senses”.8
Despite the occasional use of the term ‘action’ [Handlung], Kant does not hold 
that we choose to form the categories. He classifies the categories as “given con­
cepts”, as opposed to “made concepts” like mermaid.9 A “concept is given insofar 
as it does not arise from my faculty of choice [Willkür]”.10 The formation of the cat­
egories is the result of spontaneous mental acts. We carry out those acts “on the 
occasion of experience” because, “[a]s far as time is concerned no cognition in us 
precedes experience, and with experience every cognition begins” (B1; see B118). 
Cognitions in Kant’s sense include not only judgements, but also concepts.11
“[A]lthough all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on 
that account arise from experience” (B1). This is the case for the categories, that 
are given a priori with regard to their content.12 This means that their content 
does not depend on the content of our experience, unlike the content of empirical 
concepts such as gold. What, then, determines their content?
Kant’s texts from the 1770s and early 1780s state repeatedly that we form the 
categories by abstraction. Occasionally, they also mention reflection, stating for 
8 ML1, 28:233  f. The claim that the categories are formed on the occasion of experience is reiter­
ated in A66/B91; A86/B118; Refl. 4172 from 1769–1770, 17:443; ML1, 28:190; MVolckmann, 28:373  f.; 
MMrongovius, 29:762  f. See Oberhausen 1997, 115–118.
9 Kant’s example is the concept of a naval clock that, in his time, had not yet been invented.
10 WienerL, 24:914. Kant distinguishes given concepts from those that arise from the faculty of 
choice, e.  g. in A729/B757.
11 See e.  g. A320/B376  f. This is Kant’s broad sense of ‘cognition’ [Erkenntnis]. For the narrow 
sense, see e.  g. A92/B125, B146.
12 A729/B757; LBusolt, 24:654; WienerL, 24:914.
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instance that the categories are “abstract concepts of reflection”.13 Their content 
must derive from whatever the relevant acts of abstraction and reflection are 
applied to. These might be either the laws that define the logical forms of judge­
ment, or acts of sensible synthesis. Let me illustrate each suggestion in turn.
Kant’s texts from the 1770s state that the categories are abstracted “on the 
occasion of experience from the laws of reason”,14 “the laws inherent to the 
mind”15 or the “laws of our thought”.16 The Metaphysical Deduction of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason relates each category to the laws that define a logical form 
of judgement.17 Thus, building on Kant’s statement that the Metaphysical Deduc­
tion establishes the “origin” of the categories (B159), one might take them to 
derive from reflection on the logical forms of judgement.18
To clarify how this process might take place, let us consider the category of 
substance. On the occasion of experience, the senses gather information and 
convey it to the understanding. Being the “faculty of rules” (A126, A158/B197, 
A299/B356), the understanding has a natural propensity to reflect on the infor­
mation that it receives from the senses in order to seek regularities. It “is always 
busy poring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in 
them” (A126). The acts with which the understanding reflects on the information 
provided by the senses are acts of judgement, because “[w]e can […] trace all acts 
of the understanding back to judgements”.19 Being conscious of our own acts of 
judgement, we spontaneously apply our tendency to seek regularities to them. By 
doing this, we note that several of our judgements ascribe properties (predicates) 
to objects (subjects), that is, they are categorical judgements. Our understanding 
includes the capacity to abstract, that is, to divert attention from the features that 
differentiate judgements of this kind and to focus on their shared feature, which is 
their logical form.20 By reflecting on the form of categorical judgements, the under­
13 Refl. 409 from 1772–1779?, 15:155; see ML1, 28:233; MVolckmann, 28:373  f.; MMrongovius, 
29:761  f.
14 Refl. 4172 from 1769–1770, 17:443.
15 De mundi, 2:395.
16 Refl. 3988 from 1769, 17:378; see Refl. 3930 from 1769, 17:352.
17 A76–83/B102–109. Early statements of this doctrine of the origin of the categories can be 
found in Refl. 3930, 4172 from 1769–1770, 17:352, 443; Refl. 4851 from 1776–1778, 18:8. Kant’s ref­
erences to the original acquisition of the categories in texts from the 1790s fit easily within this 
picture (Entd., 8:223; MK3, 29:951).
18 See A321/B377  f. and Oberhausen 1997, 196  f., 213–219. I do not take a stand on whether this 
process presupposes, as an intermediate step, the formation of schemata (Longuenesse 1998).
19 A69/B94, trans. modified.
20 For Kant’s understanding of abstraction, see PrAnthr, 7:131.
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standing gives rise to the concept of “something that can exist only as subject and 
never as mere predicate”:21 an ultimate subject of predication, that is, a bearer of 
properties that cannot itself be borne by anything else. This is Kant’s concept of 
substance. More precisely, it is the pure, non­schematized category of substance.22
On this account, we formulate judgements before forming the categories. 
This may seem to be incompatible with two Kantian tenets. First, Kant holds that 
we can judge only if we possess concepts, because judgements are composed by 
concepts.23 Second, Kant states that the acquisition of empirical concepts presup­
poses the possession of intellectual concepts, of which the categories are the fore­
most examples (Entd., 8:222  f.). It follows that we can only formulate judgements 
if we already possess intellectual concepts, presumably including the categories. 
Thus, we cannot formulate judgements before forming the categories.
To avoid this difficulty, one could hold that the categories are formed through 
reflection on a special kind of judgements, or of representations similar to judge­
ments (proto­judgements), that are formed by non­conceptual representations.24 
Alternatively, one could hold that the categories derive from non­judicative acts 
of sensible synthesis that we carry out on occasion of experience. For instance, 
when we represent perceived objects as being permanent across time, that is, as 
substances, we combine successive sensory representations as belonging to a 
single item. Reflection on these acts of combination might lead to the formation 
of the category of substance.25
21 B288; see A348, B129, B289.
22 According to Grüne 2009, reflection and abstraction are acts through which we do not form 
the categories, but we render obscure (i.  e. unconscious) categories clear (i.  e. conscious). I do not 
follow Grüne’s interpretation because several Kantian texts state that reflection and abstraction 
are necessary for forming concepts, rather than for transforming obscure concepts into clear 
concepts. Readers who endorse Grüne’s interpretation are invited to regard this paper as a com­
parison of Leibniz’s views on the origin of intellectual concepts with Kant’s views on the origin 
of what Grüne calls “the categories as clear concepts”.
23 Kant uses the term ‘judgement’ for acts of judging and for the mental representations associ­
ated with those acts. Roughly, Kantian judgements in the first sense are acts of formulating sen­
tences in one’s mind. According to Kant, while we perform those acts we combine concepts into 
certain mental contents. Judgements in the second sense are mental combinations of concepts, 
which form what Kant calls the matter or content of judgements (A266/B322; WienerL, 24:928). 
Judgements in the second sense are composed by concepts.
24 This suggestion is fleshed out in Vanzo 2012, 147–181. Zuckert’s account of Kant’s views on 
empirical concept formation employs the expression “proto­disjunctive judging” to characterize 
a “non­conceptually guided, but nonetheless proto­conceptual (i.  e. unifying), synthesis of the 
sensibly given manifold” (Zuckert 2007, 46, 55).
25 See Kant’s characterizations of the schema and schematized category of substance (A144/
B183, A242  f./B300  f.). For a more precise characterization of this proposal, see Grüne 2009, 218  f.
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In what follows, I will not discuss whether the categories are best conceived 
of as deriving from reflection on acts of sensible synthesis or on the forms of 
judgements or proto­judgements. Establishing this would require a lengthy dis­
cussion that does not bear on the relation of Kant’s views to Leibniz’s. Instead, I 
will discuss two objections that can be raised against both accounts of the forma­
tion of the categories. According to these objections, the accounts cannot express 
Kant’s considered view because they conflict with other claims he makes. I will 
consider two putative conflicts. First, the accounts might appear to entail that 
the categories are not pure concepts, as Kant claims, but empirical concepts. The 
example of the acquisition of substance makes clear that, in order to form that 
concept, we must have had some experience. This is required by four of Kant’s 
statements: “all of our cognition commences with experience” (B1); we have 
“absolutely no implanted or innate representations” or “cognitions” (Entd., 8:221; 
MSchön, 28:468); the categories are formed “on the occasion of experience”;26 
and “we can search in experience” for “the occasional causes” of their “genera­
tion, where the impressions of the senses provide the first occasion for opening 
the entire power of cognition to them”.27 Nevertheless, the accounts provided 
above do not make substance an empirical concept in Kant’s sense because 
“nothing is to be encountered” in its content “that belongs to sensation”.28 Our 
sensations provide the content of empirical judgements, but substance does not 
derive from reflection on their content. It derives from reflection on their form, 
which does not depend on our sensations. Any sensory experience, regardless of 
its content, will prompt our mind to formulate judgements of subject­predicate 
form, from which we derive the category of substance. This explains why the cat­
egories, unlike empirical concepts, are “universal” concepts.29 We all share the 
same concept of substance because we all form subject­predicate judgements and 
we reflect on them, even though the contents of those judgements and the experi­
ences on which they depend vary from one person to another.
Second, one might claim that we cannot form the categories by carrying 
out mental acts on the occasion of experience because we must possess the 
categories to have experience in the first place. As Kant states in B161, “the cat­
26 See note 8 above. 
27 A86/B118. On Sloan’s and Zammito’s readings, Kant’s biological metaphors too support the 
claim that the categories are formed on the occasion of experience, rather than being present in 
the mind at birth. 
28 A20/B34. This is a definition of “pure representation”. It applies to substance because the 
categories are pure representations.
29 Entd., 8:223; see Grüne 2009, 142  f. For the claim that different people have different empirical 
concepts, see A727  f./B755  f.
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egories are conditions of the possibility of experience”. To dispel this worry, we 
should distinguish between experience in the strong sense (experiences), which 
is informed by the categories, and experience in the weak sense (experiencew), 
which is not.30 We need not claim that adult human beings, who possess the cat­
egories, have experiencew. However, we should limit the import of passages like 
B161 to beings who possess the categories and we should ascribe experiencew to 
young infants, who have not yet formed them. A full defense of the claim that 
Kant admits experiencew would require an entire paper. However, an overview of 
Kant’s statements on young infants will suffice to lend plausibility to this view. 
Kant’s texts on anthropology outline the passage from having mere “perception” 
to having “knowledge” and “experience” (PrAnthr, 7:128). Other texts call this the 
passage from appearance [Erscheinung] to experience [Erfahrung] through the 
application of the categories (e.  g. Prol., 4:312; Refl. 5203 [ca. 1776–1778], 18:117). 
In order to progress from perception, appearance or experiencew to knowledge or 
experiences, we must be able to visually track objects presented to us (PrAnthr, 
7:127  f.). To do this, we must “employ the organs” of sight “to dilate and restrict the 
pupils at will” (ACollins, 25:58), but we acquire this skill only around the fourth 
month (PrAnthr, 7:127; ABrauer, 21). It follows that infants under four months 
do not have experiences, but only experiencew. Kant states that the capacity to 
reflect, which is required for the acquisition of the categories, undergoes a similar 
development, as does the capacity to form a concept of oneself.31
3  Leibniz and Kant on the Origin of Intellectual 
Concepts
The following four subsections will explore the differences and points of agree­
ment between Kant and Leibniz regarding the origin of intellectual concepts: 
(1) the ways in which they are based on dispositions, (2) the role of experience in 
their manifestation, (3) the process by which the dispositions related to intellec­
tual concepts are manifested, as well as (4) the relation between sensory stimuli 
and the content of intellectual concepts.
30 Both are instances of conscious experience because experience in Kant’s sense is always con­
scious (EE, 20:208). In this paper, I follow Kant’s usage. When using the term “experience”, I 
always refer to conscious experience.
31 PrAnthr, 7:127  f.; ACollins, 25:57; Menschenkunde, 25:860.
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3.1 Dispositional Innateness
There are four substantive points of agreement between Kant’s and Leibniz’s 
views on the origin of intellectual concepts. To begin with, both Leibniz and 
Kant hold that intellectual concepts are dispositionally innate. A concept is dis­
positionally innate if and only if we have a disposition since birth to entertain 
thoughts involving that concept under appropriate circumstances.32
Leibniz’s view that intellectual concepts are dispositionally innate is well 
known. It is borne out by a famous line in the Preface to the New Essays: “[t]his is 
how ideas and truths are innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, 
or natural potentialities, and not as actions” (NE, Preface, 52, see I.iii.20). As for 
Kant, the dispositional innateness of intellectual concepts follows from a passage 
of the work against Eberhard:
There must indeed be a ground for it in the subject, however, which makes it possible that 
these representations [those of space and time and the categories] can arise in this and no 
other manner, and be related to objects which are not yet given, and this ground at least is 
innate. (Entd., 8:221  f.)
This ground must consist of innate faculties or capacities because, as the Meta-
physik von Schön states, “we cannot admit any innate cognitions at all, but only 
innate faculties and capacities”.33 Which faculties or capacities provide such a 
ground depends on how, exactly, the categories are formed. If they derive from 
reflection on acts of judgement, the ground might consist of innate capacities to 
judge and to reflect on one’s judgements. If they derive from reflection on acts 
of sensible synthesis, the ground might consist of innate capacities to carry out 
acts of sensible synthesis and to reflect on them. In either case, if the exercise of 
innate capacities leads to the formation of the categories, then the categories are 
dispositionally innate.
Curiously, the textual evidence for the dispositional innateness of intellec­
tual concepts is found in a work where Kant denies that we have innate concepts. 
I will explain why Kant was concerned to deny this in Section 4. For the time 
being, it is useful to discuss how Kant might respond to the charge that, contrary 
to what he claims, he is a concept innatist.
32 Dispositional notions of conceptual innateness are widely used (e.  g. Scott 1995, 93–95; De 
Rosa 2004; Boyle 2009, 14).
33 MSchön, 28:468. Other passages ascribe innate faculties and capacities to us. See KU, 5:307; 
ADohna, 161; MSVigilantius, 27:571; MK3, 29:949.
Brought to you by | University of Warwick
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/22/18 12:52 PM
 Leibniz on Innate Ideas and Kant on the Origin of the Categories   27
The statement that only “faculties and capacities” are truly innate suggests a 
possible answer. Kant might claim that dispositional innateness is not the innate­
ness of a concept, but only the innateness of certain capacities. It is misleading to 
say that the categories are dispositionally innate. All that is really innate are the 
capacities that lead us to entertain the categories.
In response, one can grant that, for Kant, the dispositional innateness of 
intellectual concepts depends on the innateness of faculties and capacities. This 
implies that the innateness of intellectual concepts is not a basic or primitive 
form of innateness. However, it is unclear why it should imply that it is not a real, 
albeit derivative, form of innateness.
We might suppose that Kant did not regard it as an authentic form of innate­
ness on Lockean grounds. As is well known, Locke held “that the dispositional 
theory trivializes the doctrine of innate ideas”.34 In his view, saying that an idea 
is dispositionally innate amounts to saying that we are able to form that idea. 
This would make all the ideas that we are able to form innate, rendering the very 
notion of innateness trivial. Leibniz replied that the dispositional theory is not 
trivial because our mind is “differentially predisposed” to form certain ideas, but 
not others (Jolley 2005: 114).
Kant could not reject the dispositional innateness of the categories on 
Lockean grounds. This is because, exactly like Leibniz, Kant holds that we have a 
differential predisposition to entertain the categories, rather than empirical con­
cepts, under appropriate circumstances.35 In his view, we may or may not enter­
tain any given empirical concept. However, we will entertain the categories if we 
entertain any concepts at all. This can be gathered from Kant’s claim that the 
categories, unlike empirical concepts, are necessary conditions for experiences 
(B161). It is reinforced by his statement in the work against Eberhard that the 
acquisition of empirical concepts “already presupposes universal transcendental 
concepts of the understanding” (Entd., 8:222  f.). Not only are intellectual concepts 
dispositionally innate for Kant as they are for Leibniz, but also, Kant can employ 
the same argument of Leibniz to deny that dispositional innateness is a trivial 
form of innateness.36
34 Jolley 1990, 158. See Locke 1975 [1690], I.ii.5 and the comment of Locke’s spokesman in NE, 
I.i.5.
35 A passage in the B­Deduction (B145  f.) suggests that we might also have a predisposition to 
entertain the categories, rather than other a priori concepts.
36 Note that the dependence of dispositionally innate concepts on faculties or capacities is not 
distinctive of Kant’s philosophy, as opposed to Leibniz’s. Every form of dispositional innateness 
presupposes the possession of innate faculties or capacities. This is because a concept is dispo­
sitionally innate only if we have a disposition since birth to entertain thoughts involving that 
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3.2 The Role of Experience
The second point of agreement between Leibniz and Kant is that, according to 
both, the dispositions related to intellectual concepts are manifested on the same 
occasion. We saw above that, for Kant, we come to entertain the categories on the 
occasion of experience. Leibniz too states that, although intellectual concepts are 
innate, “without the senses we would never think of” them (NE, I.i.11). The same 
applies to any other concepts and thoughts:
Experience is necessary […] in order that it [the soul] take notice of the ideas which are in 
us. (NE, II.i.2)
I agree that, in the present state, the external senses are necessary for our thinking, and that 
if we did not have any, we would not think.37
These passages make clear that, for Leibniz as for Kant, the dispositions related to 
intellectual concepts are manifested on the occasion of experience. Yet these pas­
sages also reveal a difference between Leibniz and Kant. Unlike Kant (e.  g. A86/
B118), Leibniz does not explicitly state that intellectual concepts are formed or 
generated on the occasion of experience. Some texts suggest that, on the contrary, 
they are fully formed in the mind since our creation and experience only triggers 
consciousness of them. The New Essays (II.i.2) state that reflection, occasioned by 
experience, brings about the “actual perception” of distinct ideas. These “are in 
us before they are perceived”. Elsewhere, Leibniz claims that “we find” intellec­
tual ideas “in ourselves without having formed them” (NE, I.i.1). The well­known 
analogy of the veined block of marble carries the same implication (NE, Preface, 
52). Although reflection (the sculptor’s work) brings to consciousness an intellec­
tual concept (the shape of Hercules), that concept existed as a fully formed, albeit 
hidden actual mental content before it was brought to consciousness. Kant rejects 
any view along these lines when he claims that intellectual concepts are formed 
in the course of experience.
The texts reveal a difference between Kant’s and Leibniz’s choice of terms and 
images. However, this linguistic and rhetorical difference does not correspond to 
a substantive philosophical difference. This is because, although Leibniz grants 
that we have some mental content prior to experience, he provides a dispositional 
concept under appropriate circumstances. We can have a disposition since birth to entertain 
thoughts involving that concept under appropriate circumstances only if we are capable since 
birth to entertain such thoughts under appropriate circumstances. Hence, for Leibniz as well as 
Kant, the dispositional innateness of a concept presupposes innate capacities.
37 Letter to Queen Charlotte of Prussia (1702), A I xxi 344, trans. in L 551; see NE, II.xxi.73.
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account of mental content. More precisely, he provides dispositional accounts of 
innate truths, innate ideas and concept possession.
Innate truths are true propositional mental contents. They are present in our 
soul as an inborn “disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, which determines our 
soul and brings it about that those truths are derivable from it” in the course of 
experience.38 Leibniz uses similar terms for innate ideas in a passage cited at page 
9 above. The passage states that ideas “are innate in us” as “inclinations, dispo­
sitions, tendencies, or natural potentialities, and not as actions”. This applies 
not only to intellectual concepts but to all ideas, because all ideas are innate. To 
possess a concept of x means to have a “faculty of thinking” about x, an “ability to 
think about” that “thing”,39 a disposition to form thoughts concerning it:
That the ideas of things are in us means therefore nothing but that God, the creator alike of 
the things and of the mind, has impressed a power of thinking upon the mind so that it can 
by its own operations derive what corresponds perfectly to the nature of things.40
Leibniz’s dispositional account of innate truths, innate ideas and concept posses­
sion constrains the interpretation of the claim that we “find” intellectual concepts 
“in ourselves without having formed them, though the senses bring them to our 
awareness” (NE, I.i.1). This sentence is sometimes taken to refer to the passage 
from concepts that are actually, but obscurely, present in our mind to concepts 
that are both actual and clear. This interpretation contradicts Leibniz’s statement 
that intellectual concepts are innate in us only as dispositions. The act of finding 
a concept within ourselves is the first manifestation of our disposition to have 
thoughts involving that concept on the occasion of experience. If this is correct, 
Leibniz and Kant should not be contrasted as endorsing respectively content 
innateness and faculty innateness.41 They both hold that intellectual concepts 
are dispositionally innate. What Leibniz calls finding and Kant calls generating 
those concepts is the first manifestation of certain dispositions in the course of 
experience.
John Callanan holds that, nevertheless, Leibniz and Kant ascribe different 
roles to experience:
38 NE, I.i.11, echoed in a letter to T. Burnett (1703), G 3:291. On Leibniz’s choice of terms, see 
Tonelli 1974, 442  f.
39 Quid sit Idea?, G 7:263, trans. in L 207.
40 Quid sit Idea?, G 7:264, trans. in L 208.
41  Cf. Zöller 1989, 224, 227  f., 230; Waxman 1991, 20; 2005, 26 n. 10; Hanna 2001, 32.
Brought to you by | University of Warwick
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/22/18 12:52 PM
30   Alberto Vanzo
For Leibniz, the role of sensible experience is at most that of a possible enabling condi­
tion for the realization of contents determined by the predisposition of our rational capaci­
ties alone. (1) Such a conception makes space for the possibility of an application of those 
rational capacities through alternative enabling conditions (such as the intuitional capaci­
ties of a different kind of being) – on such a conception, human sensibility is merely a suf­
ficient but not necessary condition for the realization of the outputs of our rational capaci­
ties. Kant’s discursivity thesis on the other hand entails that the contribution of sensibility 
is not a mere enabling condition for concept­application. (2) Sensibility must instead be 
thought of as co­determining the possible “sense and significance” (Sinn und Bedeutung) 
of our a priori concepts in combination with the contribution of the understanding. An a 
priori concept’s application conditions, i.  e. sensible intuition, provide strict limits for any 
possible application of the categories.42
Kant’s views are closer to Leibniz’s than this passage indicates. To take (1) first, 
Kant states that “room […] remains for some other sort of intuition [than ours] 
and therefore also for things as its objects” (A286/B343; see Prol., 4:351). The 
categories would apply to the sensible intuitions of such non­human beings 
as they do to our own intuitions. This is because the categories “are free from” 
the “limitation” to “our sensible intuition” and “extend to objects of intuition in 
general, whether the latter be similar to our own or not, as long as it is sensi­
ble and not intellectual” (B148). This means that, for Kant as for Leibniz, human 
sensibility is not “a necessary condition for the realization of the outputs of our 
rational capacities”, including the manifestation of dispositions related to the 
categories.
Turning to (2), the application of the categories beyond the boundaries of 
human intuition is possible because Kant holds that sensibility limits neither the 
meaningfulness, nor the applicability of the categories. “[A]fter abstraction from 
every sensible condition”, the pure categories still have a “meaning [Bedeutung]”, 
albeit “only a logical meaning” (A147/B186, trans. modified; see A219/B267). Even 
if we set aside the hypothesis of beings with non­human forms of intuition, Kant 
holds that the logical meaning of the categories can be determined in more than 
one way. Consider the category of cause. Its logical meaning is defined in very 
broad terms as “something that allows an inference to the existence of some­
thing else” (A243/B301). Kant specifies this notion in two different ways, which 
correspond to the two “sides” or “kinds of causality” (A538/B566, A543/B571). 
On the one hand, there is “sensible causality”, which belongs to the “sensible 
world” and is “conditioned” or “mechanically necessary” in “accordance with 
constant natural laws” (A538/B566; A539/B567; KpV, 5:104). On the other hand, 
42 Callanan 2013, 14  f., numbers added.
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there is “intelligible causality” or “causality through freedom”, which belongs 
to the “intelligible world” of the noumenal self (A358/B566; KpV, 5:49, 104). It is 
“unconditioned”, “original” and “free” from natural necessity, relating instead to 
the moral law (A541/B569; A544/B572; KpV, 5:49, 50).
The notion of sensible causality derives from the schematization of the pure 
category of cause, which identifies the conditions under which we can apply 
the category to objects of sensible intuition. Intelligible causality – the causal­
ity of the non­sensible, noumenal self – “receives meaning” not from conditions 
of sensible application, but from pure reason and its “moral law” (KpV, 5:49). 
Claims concerning intelligible causality are instances of thought, as opposed to 
theoretical knowledge (KpV, 5:50). Nevertheless, Kant stresses that we ought to 
admit such a causality (KpV, 5:29  f.). We can conclude that neither for Leibniz, 
nor for Kant does “sensible intuition” provide “strict limits for any possible appli­
cation of the categories”. Kant too holds that the meaning and applicability of 
at least some intellectual concepts extend beyond the “restricting condition” of 
sensibility.43
3.3 Reflection and Attention
The third point of agreement between Leibniz and Kant concerns the process 
whereby the dispositions related to intellectual concepts are manifested. Neither 
Leibniz, nor Kant provide many details of how this process unfolds. However, 
they both reject Plato’s suggestion that it is a process of recollection (e.  g. NE, 
I.i.5; MVolckmann, 28:371  f.) and they both claim that it involves reflection. 
Leibniz calls intellectual concepts “ideas of reflection” (NE, I.i.23). He states that 
“reflection suffices to discover the idea of substance within ourselves”.44 Kant 
would deny that reflection suffices to discover the notion of substance, but he 
43 A146/B186. Kant calls the formation of the categories original acquisition, as opposed to the 
derivative acquisition of empirical concepts (Entd., 8:222  f.). According to Callanan 2013, 17, this 
implies that the categories are “originally manifested only through the conditions of sensible 
intuition that make experience of objects possible”, beyond which they lack “sense and signif­
icance”. Yet, as Yamane 2008, 832–836, has shown, with the expression “original acquisition” 
Kant only means that the categories are not derived from anything external to the understanding. 
This may be sensations, as is the case for empirical concepts, or divine illumination, as Crusius 
claimed. Kant’s use of “original acquisition” does not rule out that the logical meaning of the 
categories can be further specified in more than one way, as is the case for the category of cause.
44 NE, I.iii.18. Leibniz also claims that, “to be aware of what is [innately] within us, we must be 
attentive” (NE, I.i.25, see I.ii.12).
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agrees that reflection plays a central role in its acquisition. He calls the categories 
“abstract concepts of reflection”45 and he repeatedly states that the formation of 
any concept involves reflection, besides comparison and abstraction.46
One might suspect that Leibniz and Kant use the term “reflection” to refer to 
different mental processes. After all, “reflection” was used in a variety of ways 
in the early modern period.47 Kant uses it in several different ways48 and neither 
he, nor Leibniz provide a detailed account of the reflection which is involved in 
concept formation. Nevertheless, their statements agree in several respects. For 
Leibniz as for Kant, the reflection in question is occasioned by experience, leads 
to the formation of intellectual concepts and involves attention. Kant describes 
the effects of attention in Leibnizian terms, as an increase in the clarity and 
distinctness of representations.49 For both Leibniz and Kant, the acts of reflec­
tion involved in the formation of intellectual concepts appear to be identical to 
a certain use of attention. While discussing innateness, Leibniz explains that 
“reflection is nothing but attention to what is within us” (NE, Preface, 51). For his 
part, Kant uses “attention” as a replacement for “reflection”. Some passages state 
that concept formation involves comparison, reflection and abstraction.50 Other 
passages call the same three mental acts comparison, attention and abstraction.51 
Kant also accepts Leibniz’s view that the acts of attention with which we form 
intellectual concepts are directed “to what is within us” (NE, Preface, 51). He adds 
that those acts do not depend on our choice. Leibniz too could make that claim 
because, like Kant, he allows for both voluntary and involuntary mental acts of 
attention.52
45 See page 22 above.
46 e.  g. Refl. 2854 and 2876 from the 1770s, 16:547, 555; WienerL, 24:907–909.
47 Compare e.  g. Locke 1975 [1690], II.i.4 with Reimarus 1766: §39.
48 Compare A260/B316 with WienerL, 24:909 = LHechsel, 396; WarschauerL, 610; Jäsche-L., 9:94.
49 On attention and clarity, see MMrongovius, 29:878; WienerL, 24:842; ADohna, 90. On attention 
and distinctness, see EE, 20:226  f. n.; LPhilippi, 24:342.
50 e.  g. Refl. 2854 and 2856 from 1773–1779?, 16:547, 555; WienerL, 24:909 = LHechsel, 396.
51 e.  g. LPölitz, 24:567; WienerL, 24:907 = LHechsel, 394. WarschauerL, 610, calls the second men­
tal act “reflection or attention”, suggesting that the two terms are interchangeable.
52 NE, II.i.14, II.xix.1. For examples, see respectively NE, II.i.14, II.xix.1.
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3.4 Input/Output Innateness
The fourth point of agreement between Leibniz and Kant concerns the relation 
between sensory stimuli and the content of intellectual concepts. Leibniz and 
Kant agree that, although sensory stimuli occasion acts of reflection and atten­
tion, the content of intellectual concepts is not derived from those stimuli, but 
it is contributed by the mind. This is the sense in which many authors call ideas 
(Williams 1978, 133, 135; Rozemond 1999, 457–458), beliefs (Stich 1975, 15), traits 
(Prinz 2002, 193) or conceptual structures (Chomsky 2000, 64) innate. Following 
Stephen Stich (1975, 13–16), I dub this the input/output notion of innateness. A 
concept is innate in the input/output sense if and only if, even though its acqui­
sition may have been occasioned by sensory stimuli, its content does not derive 
from sensory stimuli, but it is contributed by the mind.
As Leibniz denies body­mind interaction, he claims that no ideas, not even 
sensory ones, owe their content to sensory stimuli (NE, II.i.2). However, he 
emphasizes this for intellectual concepts, stating time and time again that they 
are “drawn from our mind”.53 Even if we accepted the “common framework”, 
according to which some mental contents are “given” to the soul “by the senses”, 
we should deny that intellectual concepts “reach us through the senses” (NE, 
I.i.1). For his part, Kant is at pains to stress that “all attempts to derive” intellec­
tual concepts
from experience, and so to ascribe to them a merely empirical origin are entirely useless 
and vain. I need not insist upon the fact that, for instance, the concept of cause involves the 
character of necessity, which no experience can yield. (A112)
Intellectual concepts “contain no sensory appearance whatsoever” and their 
content is “wholly independent of experience” (Prol., 4:315).
Despite the similarities highlighted in this section, Kant’s and Leibniz’s 
claims on the origin of intellectual concepts are not identical. On the one hand, 
Kant appears to hold that we manifest the dispositions related to intellectual con­
cepts by reflecting on forms of judgement or acts of synthesis. This claim cannot 
be found in Leibniz. On the other hand, at least on some readings (Jolley 1990, 
160–162), Leibniz holds that the dispositions related to intellectual concepts 
supervene on unconscious perceptions. Although Kant agrees with Leibniz on 
the pervasiveness of unconscious mental processes (PrAnthr, 7:135), he does not 
link intellectual concepts to unconscious perceptions, nor does he ever explain 
53 NE, I.i.23; see e.  g. Preface, 48: “the soul inherently contains” their “source [principes]”.
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whether the dispositions associated with intellectual concepts have a categorical 
basis and, if so, what it might be. Despite these differences, Kant’s views on the 
origin of intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Most notably, 
intellectual concepts are innate in the dispositional and input/output sense both 
on Leibniz’s and Kant’s account.54
4 Kant’s Arguments against Preformationism
This section discusses an objection against the ascription of innatism to Kant. 
The objection is that Kant cannot have been an innatist because he formulates 
three arguments against innatism: the lazy reason argument, the no necessity 
argument and the slippery slope argument.55 I argue that the three arguments are 
compatible with Kant’s innatism and are best seen as addressing another kind of 
innatism, Christian Adolf Crusius’ preformationism. Preformationists rely on the 
claim that God planted certain concepts in our mind at the beginning of our life, 
or even in a previous life,56 to explain (a) the origin of innate concepts and (b) the 
fact that objects of experience exemplify those concepts.57 Kant appeals to God 
neither in his account of (a) the origin of intellectual concepts, nor in the Tran­
scendental Deduction, that accounts for  (b). Hence, Kant’s arguments against 
preformationism do not pose any threat to his brand of innatism.
54 Quarfood 2004, 87, identifies a further difference between Kant and Leibniz. Kant focused 
on epistemological questions, “whereas the Leibnizian view is closely bound to the ontology 
of monadology”. Yet this, per se, does not require Kant’s views on the origin of the categories 
to differ significantly from Leibniz’s views. Also, pace Quarfood 2004, 89, although explaining 
the formation of the categories was not one of Kant’s central concerns, it is not an “irrelevant” 
concern. Kant’s view that experiences presupposes the employment of pure concepts naturally 
raises the question of how we come to possess those concepts.
55 I do not discuss a fourth argument, which I have found only in one lecture transcript 
(MSchön, 28:468).
56 See Br., 10:131 on Plato. Although Kant regards Plato as a preformationist, his criticisms of 
preformationism focus mostly on Crusius.
57 Crusius also holds that innate concepts are dispositionally innate, that we become conscious 
of them on the occasion of experience, and that unconscious innate concepts influence our 
behavior. See Crusius 1744, §92; 1745, §232; 1747, §82, 83 and 257. Kant associates Crusius with 
preformationism, e.  g. in Prol., 4:319; Refl. 4893  f. from 1776–1778, 18:21  f.
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4.1 The Lazy Reason Argument
The lazy reason argument can be found in texts from the 1770s and early 1780s. 
On the face of it, they employ the argument against a variety of targets: the admis­
sion of anything (presumably, any representation) as innate (Enzikl., 29:16); the 
admission of innate “concepts” of space and time (De mundi, 2:406); Crusius’ 
“ready­made [eingepflantzte] concepts” (Br., 10:131); or “uncreated and inborn 
[unerschaffen und ungebohren (sic)] concepts”, again with reference to Crusius.58 
The texts reject innatism on a methodological ground: “one must remain within 
nature as long as it is possible, without appealing to God straight away”.59 This 
sentence has two implications. The first is that, in order to explain the origin of 
concepts, innatists must appeal to God. Not by chance, the expositions of the 
lazy reason argument mention Crusius, for whom God planted innate concepts 
in our mind. The second implication is that it is possible to explain the origin of 
concepts while remaining “within nature”. The argument goes as follows:
[P1] It is methodologically unsound to accept supernatural explanations of a phe­
nomenon if a natural explanation is available.
[P2] A natural explanation of the origin of concepts is available.
[C1] It is methodologically unsound to accept supernatural explanations of the 
origin of concepts.
[P3] Innatists must accept a supernatural explanation of the origin of concepts.
[C2] Innatism is methodologically unsound.60
This argument is not compelling against innatism in general because innatists 
need not make any claims about God or supernatural entities. They can provide 
naturalistic (e.  g. evolutionary) explanations of the origin of concepts. Indeed, 
Chomsky (1966, 65) and his followers often stress that innatism is an empir­
ical, naturalistically respectable hypothesis. The lazy reason argument only 
prevents one from embracing innatism in conjunction with theological claims 
such as those made by Crusius. Kant outlines the origin of arbitrary concepts like 
mermaid from mental operations on previously acquired concepts, the origin of 
58 ML1, 28:233, trans. modified.
59 Enzikl., 29:16; see De mundi, 2:406; Refl. 4473 from 1772, 17:564; Br., 10:131; ML1, 28:233; A772–
774/B800–802; Prol., 4:322; MSchön, 28:467  f.
60 Some passages appear to support the following variant of the argument. (P1) It is methodo­
logically unsound to accept supernatural explanations. (P2) Innatists must accept a supernatu­
ral explanation of the origin of concepts. (C) Innatism is methodologically unsound.
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empirical concepts from the processing of sensory information, and the origin of 
intellectual concepts from the manifestation of inborn dispositions to reflect on 
our own mental acts.61 As none of these explanations combines innatism with 
theological claims, the lazy reason argument does not apply to Kant. However, it 
applies to Crusius’ preformationism.
4.2 The No Necessity Argument
According to Graciela De Pierris (1987, 293  f.), Kant argues against innatism in a 
passage of the B­Deduction (henceforth: the Deduction) of the Critique of Pure 
Reason (B167  f.). The passage contains two arguments, the no necessity argument 
and the slippery slope argument. Both are directed against the view that the cat­
egories are “subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with 
our existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with 
the laws of nature along which experience runs (a kind of preformation-system of 
pure reason)” (B167). Thus, Kant’s target is not innatism as such, but preforma­
tionism.62
Having claimed that the Deduction explains how the “necessary agreement 
of experience” with the categories “can be thought” (B166), Kant asks whether 
preformationism too can explain this. He denies that it can. Preformationism 
explains the agreement of experience with the categories, but it does not provide 
any reason to regard it as necessary. If we replaced the theory outlined in the 
Deduction with preformationism, “the categories would lack the necessity that 
is essential to their concept”. For instance, “I would not be able to say that the 
effect is combined with the cause in the object (i.  e. necessarily), but only that I 
am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so 
connected” (B168).
What does this lack of necessity amount to? According to the standard 
reading (e.  g. Kemp Smith 1923, 6  f.), Kant means that, if we replaced the theory of 
61 As for why we have certain inborn dispositions, rather than others, Kant would probably 
claim that the answer lies beyond our reach. He holds that it is impossible for us to answer ques­
tions on the basic structure of our cognitive system (B145  f.; Entd., 8:249  f.). Kant might have held 
that this depends on the choice of a divine creator. However, he would deny that, from a theo­
retical point of view, we can know whether this is the case, because we cannot have theoretical 
knowledge of God.
62 Zöller 1988, 78, and Callanan 2013 noted that Kant employs the no necessity argument pri­
marily against Crusius.
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the Deduction with preformationism, the claim that objects of experience neces­
sarily exemplify the categories would not be warranted. According to John Calla­
nan (2013, 20), Kant means that, if we replaced the theory of the Deduction with 
preformationism, we would not be able to generate empirical judgements with 
the form “it seems to me that necessarily p”, “where p makes some reference to 
an object or objects”. On both readings, the no necessity argument is directed 
against preformationism. However, if that argument can be directed against 
innatism in general as De Pierris suggests, or at least against Kant’s innatism, we 
will have reason to doubt that Kant was an innatist. It is preferable not to ascribe 
to Kant a view refuted by his own arguments.
The no necessity argument, however, does not threaten Kant’s innatism. This 
is because it does not aim to show that innatism, or even preformationism, is 
false. It only aims to show that preformationism fails to account for the necessary 
agreement between the categories and the objects of experience. Kant provides 
explanations of why there is such an agreement in the 1781 and 1787 versions of 
the Transcendental Deduction. Those explanations are compatible with a range 
of accounts of the origins of the categories. Space constraints prevent me from 
reconstructing those explanations in any detail. However, a sketch of the argu­
ment of the B­Deduction will suffice to make this apparent.
Kant argues that the objects of experience necessarily exemplify the cat­
egories because, in order to be conscious of what we are experiencing, we must 
carry out acts of judgement (B131  f.). Every act of judgement involves the sub­
sumption of what is being judged about under the categories (B143). As a con­
sequence, experience involves the subsumption of objects of experience under 
the categories. This argument presupposes that the categories are available for 
us to apply to objects of experience. However, the argument does not entail any 
specific view on how they became available to us. It may be because, during the 
first months of our lives, we had a weak, non­categorial kind of experience (expe­
riencew), we carried out mental acts on it, we reflected on those acts, and this 
led to the manifestation of certain innate dispositions. As we saw in Section 2, 
this is the account of the origin of the categories that Kant’s texts point towards. 
Yet it is not the only possible account of how the categories became available 
to us. They may have been implanted in our mind through surgical brain rewir­
ing. They may even have been implanted in our mind by God. Although, else­
where, Kant rejects this hypothesis on methodological grounds, the Deduction 
does not claim that it is false, but only that it fails to explain the necessary 
agreement between categories and objects. The argument of the Deduction, 
which explains that agreement, works equally well (or equally badly) regard­
less of whether the categories derive from reflection on our mental operations, 
from brain rewiring, or from divine acts, although each of these accounts raises 
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further questions that a full­blooded theory of the origin of the categories should 
address.63
If this is correct, then neither the no necessity argument, nor the broader 
argument of the Deduction implies the falsity of innatism. The no necessity argu­
ment may refute preformationism as an explanation of the necessity of the cat­
egories, but it is compatible with a variety of accounts of their origin, including 
Kant’s own innatist account.
4.3 The Slippery Slope Argument
When Kant outlines the no necessity argument, he puts forward the slippery 
slope argument as an aside. Once we accept preformationism with regard to intel­
lectual concepts, “no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposi­
tion of predetermined dispositions [Anlagen] for future judgements”.64 As prede­
termined dispositions are those associated with innate concepts, Kant is claiming 
that, if we accept preformationism with regard to intellectual concepts, we will 
have to extend it to any other concepts. As was the case for the no necessity argu­
ment, if the slippery slope argument can be directed either against innatism in 
63 I argued at page 25 that, in Kant’s view, infants who lack the categories have conscious expe­
rience (more specifically, experiencew). Hence, [C1] consciousness does not require the categor­ 
ies. Yet, the B­Deduction as I reconstructed it relies on the claim that consciousness involves 
acts of judgement and these presuppose the possession of the categories. Hence, [C2] conscious­
ness requires the categories. The conflict between [C1] and [C2] can be avoided by noting that 
Kant distinguishes between two kinds of consciousness. He calls them discursive consciousness 
or consciousness of reflection and intuitive consciousness or consciousness of apprehension 
(PrAnthr, 7:134 n., 151). Discursive consciousness gives rise to judgements of the form ‘I think that 
[…]’. It requires the possession and employment of concepts. Intuitive consciousness requires the 
performance of acts of apprehension, which is “the composition of the manifold in an empirical 
intuition” (B129). As, for Kant, non­human animals have “apprehensiones” or the “I of apprehen­
sion” (Refl. 411 from the 1770s?, 15:166; Refl. 1531 from 1797, 15:958), but lack concepts, intuitive 
consciousness does not require the possession of any concepts. Hence, it does not require the 
possession of those special concepts that are the categories. [C1] refers to intuitive conscious­
ness, whereas [C2] refers to discursive consciousness. Besides avoiding a conflict between [C1] 
and [C2], Kant’s distinction between two kinds of consciousness avoids a conflict between the 
passages that claim (Br., 11:52, 345; Jäsche-L., 9:45  f.) and those that deny that non­human ani­
mals have consciousness (LDohna, 24:702; WienerL, 24:846; LHechsel, 349; MDohna, 28:690; see 
PrAnthr, 7:127 on self­consciousness). The first set of passages refers to intuitive consciousness. 
The second set refers to discursive consciousness.
64 B167. Oberhausen 1997, 88  f., argued that the target of this argument is Crusius.
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general, or against the innatism that this paper ascribes to Kant, we will have 
reason to doubt that Kant was an innatist.
The argument, however, applies neither to innatism as such, nor to Kant’s 
particular brand of innatism. This is because innatists can discriminate innate 
from acquired concepts by following Kant’s policy for isolating intellectual con­
cepts. If the content of a concept c cannot be derived from sensory stimuli, then 
c is an intellectual concept:
[I]f you remove from your empirical concept of every object […] all those properties that 
experience teaches you, you could still not take from it that by means of which you think of 
it as a substance or as dependent on a substance […] Thus, convinced by the necessity with 
which this concept presses itself on you, you must concede that it has its seat in your faculty 
of cognition a priori. (B6)
Similarly, innatists can draw a boundary between innate and acquired concepts 
by claiming that we are entitled to regard a concept as innate if its content cannot 
be derived from sensory stimuli. This is what Leibniz claims with regard to intel­
lectual concepts. He identifies them as the concepts that we would have to regard 
as innate even if we held that our other concepts derive from experience (NE, I.i.1, 
IV.iv.5). It follows that the slippery slope argument, like the lazy reason argument 
and the no necessity argument, fails as an argument against innatism in general, 
and also as an argument against Kant’s particular form of innatism.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that, given two widespread notions of innateness, 
Kant is an innatist regarding intellectual concepts. His views on the origin of 
intellectual concepts are remarkably close to Leibniz’s. Kant’s arguments con­
cerning innatism are best seen as attacking a specific kind of innatism, prefor­
mationism, that Kant rejects because of its theological commitments. If all of this 
is correct, one is left wondering why Kant denies that he is an innatist, while 
classing Leibniz as an innatist alongside Plato and Crusius.65 There are two expla­
65 As Oberhausen 1997, 71, noted, some texts also class Pythagoras as an innatist. See LPhilippi, 
24:339; Enzikl., 29:14 and, for less explicit comments, Refl. 4449 and 4451 from about 1772–1778, 
17:555  f. Kant even takes the pain to import the expression ‘original acquisition’ from natural law 
to qualify his view of the origin of the categories as non­innatist. See Entd., 8:223; MSitten, 6:258; 
and note 43 above.
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nations for this. Although, as we shall see, they may both be correct, the second 
explanation is the best supported by Kant’s texts.
The first explanation is that Kant did not regard dispositional innatism, 
which he endorsed, as innatism, and he held that neither Leibniz, nor Crusius 
endorsed dispositional innatism. On this reading, Kant maintained that innatists 
should take innate concepts to be “at least partially formed” since birth (Callanan 
2013, 24 n. 15). If this is correct, then when Kant described Crusius as postulating 
“implanted predispositions [Anlagen] for thinking” (B167; see MK3, 29:959), he 
did not understand them as authentic dispositions, but in some other way; for 
instance, as fully formed, but latent concepts. Yet Leibniz and, quite explicitly, 
Crusius (1747, §83) favoured dispositional innatism. Is it possible that Kant failed 
to notice this?
There are three reasons to believe that he did. First, Kant had limited histori­
cal interests and he did not pay much attention to the history of innatism. This can 
be seen from the fact that his comments on earlier innatists are rather sketchy; 
that he did not even take notice of Christian Wolff’s dispositional innatism,66 
despite Wolff’s strong influence in eighteenth­century Germany and Kant’s 
praises for him (Bxxxvi); and that he did not mention Descartes’, Cudworth’s or 
More’s innatism (Oberhausen 1997, 71 n. 191). Second, the comments on Leibniz’s 
innatism in Kant’s corpus are even more sparse than those on Plato’s and Crusius’ 
innatism (Oberhausen 1997, 91). This indicates that Kant did not carefully study 
the innatist theories of the New Essays, despite their similarity to his own views.67 
Third, the philosophical influence of the New Essays on German thinkers in the 
1760s and 1770s was very limited.68 In view of this, Kant’s failure to notice that 
Leibniz was a dispositional innatist should not seem surprising.
66 Compare Wolff 1740, 508; 1751, §819 with an addition to Refl. 4446 from about 1770–1778, 
17:554, and MK3, 29:959.
67 There are three reasons to believe that, nevertheless, Kant read the New Essays. First, dis­
cussions of Leibniz’s theory of cognition appear in Kant’s notes around 1770, shortly after the 
publication of the New Essays in 1765. This is unlikely to be due to a merely indirect influence. 
The New Essays had little impact on Kant’s peers (Tonelli 1974). Second, Markus Herz (1990 
[1771], 63) relates Kant’s views on the origin of the representations of space and time to Leibniz’s 
views in his paraphrase of De mundi. Herz was the respondent at the defense of Kant’s Inaugural 
Dissertation. Kant is likely to have carefully instructed him on his views in preparation for the 
disputation (Oberhausen 1997, 119–121). Third, the transcripts of Kant’s lectures from between 
1777 and 1785 state that Leibniz was a disciple of Plato, whereas Locke was a disciple of Aristotle 
(Enzikl., 29:16; MVolckmann, 28:372, 376; MMrongovius, 29:761). This is an echo of NE, Preface, 47. 
Wolff, who passed away before the publication of the New Essays, contrasted Plato’s innatism 
with Aristotle’s and Locke’s views, but he did not mention Leibniz. See Wolff 1740, 551; 1751, §820.
68 Tonelli 1974, 446–454.
Brought to you by | University of Warwick
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/22/18 12:52 PM
 Leibniz on Innate Ideas and Kant on the Origin of the Categories   41
The second explanation is that Kant did not regard himself as an innatist 
because he did not identify innatism with a specific thesis on conceptual origin, 
but with a broad epistemological and metaphysical stance that includes a com­
mitment to God as the source of innate concepts and the guarantor of their agree­
ment with experience.69 In favor of this explanation, it should be noted that Kant 
usually classes Plato, Leibniz and Crusius as innatists. In his view, they were all 
committed to such a view of God.70 Moreover, as we saw in Section 4, some of 
Kant’s texts direct the lazy reason argument against innatism as such. This would 
hardly be justified, unless Kant thought that innatism involves a commitment 
to a supernatural being. Finally, Kant’s texts from the 1770s and 1780s associate 
innatism and its modern versions with theological commitments: 
Recently […] it was said that they [ideas] are innate […] it was held that God has placed 
certain fundamental concepts in every human soul […] (MVolckmann, 28:372; see MMron-
govius, 29:761)
If they [cognitions] are inborn, then they are revelations. (ML1, 28:233)
The doctrine of innate ideas leads to enthusiasm. (Refl. 4851 from 1776–1778, 18:8, trans. 
modified).
In eighteenth­century Germany, the term “enthusiasm” [Schwärmerei] bore reli­
gious connotations and was often associated to religious superstition.71
In conclusion, it is possible that Kant regarded Leibniz, but not himself as an 
innatist because he did not regard dispositional innatism as a form of innatism 
and he misunderstood Leibniz’s and Crusius’ positions. However, there is stronger 
evidence for the view that Kant took innatism to include unacceptable theologi­
cal commitments, and he denied that he was an innatist so as to distance himself 
from the theological commitments of earlier innatists such as Leibniz. Once we 
separate innatism from those commitments, we can appreciate that Kant is an 
innatist and that his views on the origin of intellectual concepts are much closer 
to Leibniz’s than has often been acknowledged.72
69 Oberhausen 1997, 71, 96  f.; Yamane 2008.
70 For the ascription of this view to Plato, see e.  g. Br., 10:131; MVolckmann, 28:371  f.
71 Hinske 1988; Yamane 2008, 835 n. 9.
72 I would like to thank Michael Oberst, Tom Sorell and audiences in Bucharest, London and 
Padua for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. This research was supported by a 
Marie Curie International Incoming Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework 
Programme.
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